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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
whether any personal jurisdiction was ever obtained over defendant; ap-
patently it was not, but a valid attachment was obtained prior to judg-
ment upon certain real estate of defendant. The judgment, after 5
years, became dormant and the lien thereof upon defendant's real estate
(if any there ever was) became lost.39 No sale on execution could be
had under the lien of the judgment.
The court held, however, that this did not "affect the power of sale
under the valid attachment acquired by the very rendition of the judg-
ment," and that the attaching creditor was entitled to an order of sale of
the defendant's interest in the attached real estate.
The ruling is undoubtedly correct. This writer submits, however, that
there is in the court's opinion some ambiguous and potentially dangerous
dictum, in that it seems to treat the whole proceeding as one in rem.
Certainly a court, in acting upon the property of an absent defendant is
exercising a -type of in rem jurisdiction. It is difficult to see how a per-
sonal action can, by virtue of attachment or otherwise, be turned into an
in rem action.
SAMUEL SONENFIELD
CONFLICT OF LAWS
Domicile: Person in Military Service
In Draper v. Draper' the court recognizes that it is possible for a per-
son in the military service to obtain a domicile of choice, and upholds
the trial court in its conclusion that the plaintiff did obtain such a domi-
cile in Ohio under the circumstances of this case.2 Plaintiff, whose for-
mer domicile was Michigan, was assigned to a base near Columbus, Ohio,
and lived away from the base in his own quarters. 3
Workmen's Compensation: Tort Action:
Full Faith and Credit
In the Survey of Ohio Law for 1957,4 I discussed at some length the
case of Ellis v. Garwood,5 which involved the New York workmen's com-
pensation law. Two New York employees of a New York corporation
were in Ohio on business, and, through the negligent driving of one of
them, the other was killed. His widow received compensation under the
New York workmen's compensation law and subsequently brought an
action for wrongful death in Ohio against the fellow employee.
39. OHio Ray. CODE § 2329.07.
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SURVEY OF OHIO LAW - 1958
By the New York law, the compensation obtained under the work-
men's compensation act was the exclusive remedy, and no suit against a
negligent fellow employee was permitted. Under the Ohio law, such a
suit was permitted.
The court of appeals held that the full faith and credit clause of the
United States Constitution did not prohibit the wrongful death action
in Ohio7 and that the law of Ohio, the place of the wrong, determines
whether there is a cause of action for the wrong.
During 1958, the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the judgment of
the court of appeals8 upon the ground that the lex loci deliciti governs.
The court did not refer to the full faith and credit clause0
Validity of Marriage: First Cousins
With certain exceptions not here relevant, a marriage is valid every-
where if the requirements of the marriage law of the state where the
contract of marriage takes place are complied with.' 0 In Mazzolini v.
Mazzolini,n two first cousins, Edward and Josephine, married in Massa-
chusetts. Edward's domicile was Ohio; Josephine's, Massachusetts. After
the ceremony they came to Ohio to live. The marital venture proving
unsuccessful, Edward brought an action in Ohio for annulment of the
marriage upon the ground that it was void ab initio.
By the Ohio statute dealing with ceremonial marriages, a marriage
between first cousins is not permitted. 2  By the law of Massachusetts a
marriage between first cousins is not unlawful. However, a Massachu-
setts statute, referred to in the court's opinion, provides that no marriage
shall be contracted in Massachusetts by a party residing and intending to
1. 107 Ohio App. 32, 151 N.E.2d 379 (1958).
2. The suit was for a divorce.
3. See RESTATEmNT, CONFLiCt oF LAws § 21, comment c (1934).
4. 9 WEsT. REs. L Rv. 251, 273 (1958).
5. 153 N.E.2d 715 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957).
6. U.S. CONsT. art IV, § 1.
7. The court relied on Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955).
8. Ellis v. Garwood, 168 Ohio St. 241, 152 NXE.2d 100 (1958). See also WORK-
MN'S COMPENSATION, section infra.
9. See generally Ford, The Liability of Nonemployer Tortfeasors Under State Work-
men's Compensation Statutes: A Choice-of-Law Problem, 68 YALE L. J. 54 (1958).
10. RESTATm&ENT, CONFLCr oF LAws § 121 (1934).
11. 168 Ohio St. 357, 155 N.E.2d 206 (1958). See also DoMESTIc RELATIoNs
section, infra.
12. OHio REV. CODE § 3101.01.
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continue to reside in another jurisdiction if such marriage would be void
if contracted in such other jurisdiction, and that every marriage contracted
in Massachusetts in violation of the above shall be null and void.
Recognizing the general rule that the lex loci contractus governs the
validity of the marriage, the court pointed out that under the Massachu-
setts law the marriage would be void in Massachusetts if such a marriage
would have been void if contracted in Ohio. From the choice-of-law
point of view, that is all there is to the case.
The majority of the court then decided that under the law of Ohio
marriages of first cousins are not void, even though prohibited. Conse-
quendy, the marriage was valid under the Massachusetts statutes and
therefore valid in Ohio.13
Appointment of Guardian: Jurisdiction:
Full Faith and Credit
In re Fore v. Toth' 4 is an extremely important case and was some-
thing of a cause cRl~bre, at least in the Cleveland area. I know of no
better way to present it than to quote the two paragraphs of the syllabus.
1. Where there is no existing award of custody of an orphaned minor
resident of Ohio by a foreign court, the Probate Court of the county of
such residence has jurisdiction, under Section 2111.02, Revised Code, to
appoint a guardian of the minor, irrespective of the fact that the domicil
of such minor may be in another state.
2. A decree of guardianship of a minor resident of Ohio by a court
in the state where the child has a technical domicil, which decree is made
without personal service on either the child or the person with whom
such child is living, is not entitled, under Section 1, Artide IV of the
Constitution of the United States, to such faith and credit as will nullify
the prior appointment of a guardian of such minor by the Probate Court
of the county of his residence.
The court interprets the word "resident" in Ohio Revised Code sec-
tion 2111.02 as meaning a place of dwelling within the state rather than
as being synonymous with "domicile."
In view of the court's decision, the guardian appointed by the "for-
eign" court (Louisiana), presumably the technical domicile of the child,
failed in her attempt to force the Ohio guardian to turn the child over to
her custody.
13. The three dissenting judges thought that first-cousin marriages are void under
Ohio statutory law.
14. 168 Ohio St. 363, 155 N.E.2d 194 (1958). The report of the case in the
court of appeals is in 79 Ohio L. Abs. 15, 151 N.E.2d 777 (1958). The Supreme
Court reversed the two-to-one judgment of the court of appeals.
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